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Pooling Provisions in Oil and Gas
Leases
INTRODUCTION
Drilling an oil and gas well today is a complex operation.
Before drilling a new well the operator, must determine the well's
location, obtain the right to explore for oil and gas, 2 and as
required by statute, 3 obtain a permit. This Comment investigates
situations involving leases which have been combined or "pooled
' 4
to create a new lease. In such situations confusion often results
concerning division of the lease's production.'
An oil and gas lease does not convey title to the oil and gas
beneath the earth, but gives the lessee a right to explore for, and
I Ky. REv. STAT. § 353.510(17) (Michie 1982) [hereinafter KRS] provides:
'Operator' means any owner of the right to develop, operate and produce
oil and gas from a pool and to appropriate the oil and gas produced
therefrom, either for himself or for himself and others; in the event that
there is no oil and gas lease in existence with respect to the tract in question,
the owner of the oil and gas rights therein shall be considered as 'operator'
to the extent of seven-eights (7/8) of the oil and gas in that portion of the
pool underlying the tract owned by such owner, and as 'royalty owner' as
to one-eighth (1/8) interest in such oil and gas; and in the event the oil is
owned separately from the gas, the owner of the right to develop, operate
and produce the substance being produced or sought to be produced from
the pool shall be considered as 'operator' to such pool.
See also H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANuAL OF On AND GAS TERMS 595 (6th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter WELLIAMS & MEYERS].
2 See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. An operator may obtain the right to
drill for oil and gas in one of three ways: purchase, lease or assignment.
3 KRS § 353.570(1) (1983) provides:
No person shall drill or deepen a well, or reopen a plugged well for the
production of oil or gas or for the injection of water, gas or other fluid into
any oil or gas producing formation (except seismograph test holes) after June
16, 1960, or drill or deepen a water supply well, and geological or structure
test holes after June 16, 1966, until such person shall obtain a permit from
the department [of mines and minerals as defined in KRS § 351.010].
4 WnuLAMs & MEYERS, supra note 1.
Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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take title to the oil and gas produced. 6 Unlike solid minerals, 7 oil
and gas are fugaciouss in nature, resembling wild animals. 9 As
fugacious minerals, oil and gas are not owned until severed and
produced from the earth. The oil and gas lessee's interest, there-
fore, is a non-possessory interest in real property. 0
A conveyance" is the transfer by either the lessee or lessor
of his interest, in whole or in part, 1 to a third party. Absent a
restriction in the lease, the lessee under an oil and gas lease may
convey any and all lease rights to a third party. 
14
A drilling permit is issued only when the well location is
sufficienty far from other wells and property lines. ' 5 When the
lease size is insufficient to meet the well spacing requirements,
6 Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ky. 1952); Trimble v.
Kentucky River Coal Corp., 31 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1930).
1 717 S.W.2d at 516 (stating that "[slolid minerals in place are attached to the land
itself, but title to, or interest in, those minerals may be severed from the land.").
D. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrnONARY (3rd ed. 1981) (defining fugacious
as "2. Not fixed in a certain place: wandering").
9 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. 1934).
But see Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d
25, 26 (Ky. 1987) (overruling Hammonds).
,0 Williams' Adm'r v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 143 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ky. 1940);
see also HEMNGWAY, THE LAW oF On. AND GAs § 6.1, at 240 (1983).
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
2 EmNGWAY, supra note 10, § 9.8 at 483.
13 Id.
" Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986);
cf. Coleman v. Owens, 245 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1953).
11 KRS § 353.610(l)-(2) (1983) provides:
(1) Except as provided in KRS 353.500 to 353.720, no permits shall be issued
for the drilling, deepening, or reopening of any shallow well for the produc-
tion of oil, unless the proposed location of the well shall be at least three
hundred thirty (330) feet from the nearest boundary of the premises upon
which the well is to be drilled, deepened or reopened; and, the proposed
location must be at least six hundred sixty (660) feet from the nearest oil
producing well. This subsection shall not be construed to regulate the distance
between wells which do not produce oil from the same pool.
(2) Except as provided in KRS 353.500 to 353.720, no permits shall be issued
for the drilling, deepening, or reopening of any shallow well for the produc-
tion of gas unless the proposed location of the well be at least five hundred
(500) feet from the nearest boundary of the premises upon which such well
is to be drilled, deepened or reopened; and, the proposed location must be
at least one thousand (1000) feet from the nearest gas producing well. This
subsection shall not be construed to regulate the distance between wells which
do not produce gas from the same pool.
See also 805 Ky. ADcN REGs. 1:100 (1988).
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pooling 6 becomes necessary. Pooling is the consolidation of the
oil and gas rights to two or more small tracts into a tract large
enough to meet the spacing requirements for obtaining a permit.
7
Operators using pooling for many reasons, the most important
being conservation of oil and gas, assurance of obtaining a permit,
and increasing flexibility in matching surface operations to geo-
logical structures.
8
Pooling may be accomplished by voluntary agreement, 19 a
community lease,20 a pooling clause in the lease,2' or by admin-
istrative order? 2 Voluntary pooling is accomplished by "written
Is See generally Wam.Aus & MEwRs, supra note 1, at 652 (stating that pooling is
"[tihe bringing together of small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit under
applicable spacing rules .....
17 Id.
Is Id.
,9 D. SHORT & R. THoMAS, KENTUCKY MN RAL. LAW § 31.02(A), at 127 (1986)
[hereinafter SHORT], which provides:
All of the ... owners can voluntarily form a unit by executing an agree-
ment....
Voluntary pooling agreements range from a very simple document which
allocates the royalty and establishes a single producing entity, thereby elimi-
nating concerns about internal drainage or the need to develop each lease
separately, to the complex field-wide agreement discussed under 'voluntary
unitization' (footnote omitted).
Id. § 31.02(B), at 128, which provides: "A community lease commits several tracts
of land having separate mineral owners to a single leasehold and, therefore, a common
development.... It is a form of voluntary pooling, the terms and conditions of which
are controlled by the lease itself."
2, Id. § 31.02(C), at 128, which provides: "The pooling clause in a lease authorizes
the lessee or the lessee's assignees to establish units without the consent or joinder of the
lessors. This is done by executing an 'instrument identifying and describing the pooled
acreage,' which is generally referred to as a pooling declaration." (footnote omitted).
2 KRS § 353.630(1) (Supp. 1988) provides:
Whenever any separate tract of land is so situated because of size or other
condition that it does not contain a location at which a well for oil or gas
may be drilled, deepened or reopened by reason of the spacing provisions of
KRS 353.610, the department shall order, after notice and a hearing, the
pooling of all oil and gas interests in the separate tract or in a portion
thereof with all like interests in a contiguous tract or tracts, or portions
thereof, as are necessary to afford the pooled tracts one (1) location for the
drilling, deepening or reopening of a well for the production of oil or gas in
compliance with the spacing requirements of KRS 353.500 to 353.720. The
department shall require the development and operation of all pooled tracts
as a single leasehold estate in accordance with regulations and rules prom-
ulgated under KRS 353.500 to 353.720.
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consent of all owners of oil and gas interest ' 23 in a pool.24 Typical
oil and gas lease forms, such as the Producer's 88 Revised,
25
contain pooling clauses which give the lessee power to pool the
leased acreage with other tracts, 26 and to apportion 27 the lan-
downer's royalties. 28 These royalties are apportioned pro-rata ac-
cording to each landowner's contribution of acreage to the total
pooled acreage 29 or unit. 30  Though the unit may be any
23 KRS § 353.620(1) (1983) provides:
Notwithstanding KRS 353.610, if an application is submitted for a permit to
drill, deepen or reopen a well closer to a boundary or to another well than
prescribed in KRS 353.610 and the application is accompanied by the written
consent of all owners of oil and gas interests in any premises which will be
offset by the proposed well, the department shall issue a permit for the well.
1, Smith v. Rogers, 702 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ky. 1986); see also KRS § 353.620 (1983).
25 SHORT, supra note 19, § 23.01, at 35, provides: -[T]he typical Producers 88
Revised form . . . includes a pooling clause, an entireties clause, a shut in gas well clause,
and even a gas storage clause." (footnote omitted); see also Hinton, Negotiating Oil and
Gas Leases for the Lessee, I NAT. RESOURCEs ENv'T. 7 (Spring 1985).
- See e.g., SHORT, supra note 19, form 23.01, at 10, which provides:
Lessee is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the acreage
covered by this lease or any portion thereof with other land, lease or leases
in the immediate vicinity thereof, when in lessee's judgment it is necessary
or advisable to do so in order properly to develop and operate said premises
in compliance with the spacing rules of any lawful authority, or when to do
so would, in the judgment of the lessee, promote the conservation of the oil
and gas in and under and that may be produced from said premises. In
connection with the production of oil, such pooling maybe in a unit or units
not exceeding 50 acres each. In connection with the production of gas such
pooling may be in a unit or units not exceeding 320 acres each. Lessee shall
execute in writing an instrument identifying and describing the pooled acre-
age. The entire acreage so pooled into a tract or unit shall be treated, for
all purposes except the paying of royalties on production from the pooled
unit, as if it were included in this lease. If production is found on the pooled
acreage, it shall be treated as if production is had from this lease, whether
the well or wells be located on the premises covered by this lease or not. In
lieu of the royalties elsewhere herein specified, lessor shall receive on pro-
duction from a unit so pooled only such portion of the royalty stipulated
herein as the amount of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest
therein bears to the total acreage so pooled in the particular unit involved.
Provided, lessee shall be under no obligation whatsoever, express or implied,
to drill more than one well to each such unitized tract, regardless of when,
where or by whom offset wells may be drilled.
SW IAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 45. Apportionment is the division of royalties
among the owners of interests in the land subject to the lease. The basis of division is
each land interests' contribution to the total acreage. Id.
u See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
WmLLmMs & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 651.
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shape,31 the fugacious nature of oil and gas necessitates using a
simple shape such as circle or a square. a2
Drilling commences after executing all leases, conveyances,
pooling agreements, and obtaining the permit. In the event a well
produces, the operator divides the production into payments called
royalties.3 A landowner's royalty is his share of the oil and gas
produced free from the expenses of production,4 payable either
in money or in kind.35 An overriding royalty, the royalty paid to
the lessee, is "a royalty interest carved out of the lessee's interest
under an oil and gas lease." '3 6 It is "[a]n interest in oil and gas
produced at the surface, free of the expense of production, and
in addition to the usual landowner's royalty reserved to the lessor
in an oil and gas lease." 37
Generally, landowners who have leased the mineral rights
retain a landowner's interest38 of a right to a percentage of pro-
duction. Lessees who have leased the mineral rights from the
landowner and then conveyed their rights to a third party retain
an overriding interest of a percentage of the oil and gas produc-
tion. The situation can arise where a lessee has conveyed a lease
to a third party and has reserved an overriding royalty interest.
This issue appeared in Rice Bros. Mineral Co. v. Talbott.3 9
Talbott excludes from the definition of "owners of an oil and
gas interest" under KRS section 353.62040 those lessees who re-
serve only an overriding royalty interest in a conveyance which
transfers the lease to a third party. The Talbott decision is im-
portant because all such "owners" previously had to approve the
pooling agreement in accordance with KRS section 353.620. The
11 See generally SHORT, supra note 19, § 31.02 at 131. "There is no restriction or
limitation on the shape of the unit, but failure to carefully consider the relative rights of
the lessor might amount to an act of bad faith." Id.
32 Id.
" WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 777; see also Hall v. Fuller, 352 S.W.2d
559, 561 (Ky. 1962).
352 S.W.2d at 561.
3 WmLLAh.s & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 770.
6 KuiNTZ, CASES AND MATERLS ON On AND GAS LAW, § 43 (1986).
7 WILUAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 606.
31 Id. at 450 (stating that "[a] share of the gross production of minerals free of the
costs of production").
31 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
, See supra note 23.
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plaintiff in Talbott did not sign the pooling agreement and sought
to receive his overriding royalty interest without reduction for
pooling. This Comment examines this restricted definition and its
ramifications for oil and gas lease conveyances.
I. RIcE BRos. MInv t.A CoP. v. TALBOTT
A. Factual Background
On July 15, 1979, Rice Brothers Mineral Corporation (Rice)
obtained an oil and gas lease from Ross and Ruth Baker (Baker
lease).41 The lease granted exploration and production rights to
approximately 150 acres in Leslie County, Kentucky. The Baker
lease agreement was on a standard Producer 88 Revised42 form
(Standard Form) containing all normal lease provisions,43 includ-
ing a pooling clause. 4
The lease contained two deviations from the Standard Form.
The time allowed for the lease to exist without production was
decreased from the normal ten years to two years, 45 and a line
had been drawn through the pooling clause.4 The lease reserved
to the Bakers a one-eighth (1/8) landowner's royalty.
47
Rice subsequently assigned all "rights, title and interests" in
the Baker lease to Talbott, retaining a one-eighth (1/8) overriding
royalty over and above the one-eighth landowner's royalty."
Talbott drilled two wells on the property covered by the Baker
lease.49 The first well, known as T-14, did not require pooling 0
4 Brief for Appellee, at Appendix A3, Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717
S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 85CA2727-O) [hereinafter Brief]. The assignment
reserved a one-eighth (1/8) share of production from the lease. Id. at Appendix Al (Baker
Lease Agreement).
42 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
43 Id.
- See supra note 26.
41 Brief, supra note 41, at Appendix Al (Baker Lease Agreement).
Id.
47 Brief, supra note 41.
"' Id.
- Interview with John Talbott, Attorney for Appellee, in Lexington, Kentucky (Sept.
20, 1987) [hereinafter Interview].
Id. (the well location met spacing requirements); see also supra note 16.
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and was later abandoned." The drilling of T-14 had fulfilled
Talbott's obligation under the assignment5 2 but geologic infor-
mation indicated that a site near the edge of the property was
likely for a productive well. 3 However, the proposed well site
was too close to the adjacent landower's property line to allow a
drilling permit to be issued without pooling the adjacent tracts.1
4
Talbott entered into a pooling agreement with the Bakers and the
other lessors covered by the pool.5 5 The Baker lease comprised
sixty percent (60%) of the acreage covered by the pooling
agreement 56 and would, therefore, receive sixty percent (6007o) of
the production. 7
B. The Circuit Court Decision
The second well, designated T-20, proved to be productive.
The Bakers and Rice were each paid royalties equal to one-eighth
(1/8) of sixty percent (60%) of the well's production or 7.5
percent . The Bakers accepted the royalty payments without com-
plaint. Rice, however, filed suit in Leslie Circuit Court arguing
that his overriding royalty should be one-eighth (1/8) of the well's
production, not one-eighth (1/8) of sixty percent (60%) of pro-
duction 9 Rice alleged that the original lease from the Bakers to
Rice, and Rice's assignment to Talbott, prohibited pooling the
property; he also argued that pooling was unnecessary. 60 The court
1 Id. Interview, supra note 49 (less than 1 barrel per day was produced).
12 Brief, supra note 41 (Talbott was obligated to drill a well before July 25, 1980);
see also Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960).
' Interview, supra note 49.
'" Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Brief, supra note 41, at Appendix A9. See also Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v.
Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
1 Brief, supra note 41, at Appendix A9 (Included was the provision that "In the
event that Woodrow Coots retains ownership of his oil and gas rights from a lawsuit with
Crats Rice, then the unit ownership will be as follows: Ross Baker - sixty (6007o) percent,
George Lewis - twenty-five (2506) percent, Woodrow Coots - fifteen (15076) percent.").
I d. at Appendix A8 (stating "WHEREAS, the undersigned are the owners of
royalty interest in the oil and gas in said lands and are entitled to the payment of royalties
to the extent of their respective interests in accordance with the terms and provisions of
said leases.").
" Brief, supra note 41.
Id. at Appendix A-16 (complaint filed by Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. in Leslie
Circuit Court) (No. 82-CI-220).
I Brief, supra note 60.
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granted summary judgment in favor of Talbott, and Rice ap-
pealed .
61
C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, holding that Rice was not
an owner of any oil or gas interest, affirmed the summary judg-
ment. 62 Rice, therefore, was not a necessary party to the pooling
agreement and was only entitled to one-eighth of sixty percent of
production from the pool.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Gudgel distinguished
ownership of solid minerals from ownership of oil and gas. 63 His
opinion stated that ownership of oil and gas is "limited to pos-
sessing an exclusive legal right to explore and, if oil or gas is
found, to reduce that substance to possession and ownership."
The court determined that the conveyance from Rice to Talbott
was valid 65 and stripped Rice of all ownership interest in any oil
and gas in place. 66
The court then examined the pooling agreement, noting that
"owners of all oil and gas interests in a given pool may privately
give their written consent to pooling." 67 The court concluded that
Rice's signature was not required to validate the pooling agree-
ment because he was not an "owner" within the statutory mean-
ing. 68
Finally, the court stated: "[Tihe proceeds from an oil pool in
Kentucky must be apportioned according to each person's contri-
61 Id.
Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
63 Id. at 516 (Ownership of solid minerals, such as coal entails ownership of the
minerals in place and a right to explore for and produce them. Ownership of oil and gas
is only a right to explore for and produce oil and gas.).
" Id. at 516.
63 Id. at 517 (Unless specifically prohibited in the lease, the lessee may assign any
rights possessed by virtue of that lease to a third party.).
I Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that "Thus, a lessee who has assigned all lease rights and retains only an overriding
interest possesses no ownership interest in any oil and gas in place.").
61 Id. citing Smith v. Rogers, 702 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1986); KRS § 353.620 (1983).
m Id. (stating that "[a]ppellant's consent to the disputed voluntary pooling agree-
ment, therefore was not required by KRS [§] 353.620, as it was not an 'owner' . .. within
the statutory meaning of those terms.").
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butions to the total production from the pool." 69 Since the Baker
lease comprised sixty percent of the pool, 70 Rice was entitled to
only "600/o of one-eighth overriding royalty interest or 7.5070 of
the production of the entire well."1
7'
II. ANALYSIS
In Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott,72 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals determined that one who assigns all rights, title, and
interests, reserving an overriding royalty interest, is not an "owner
of any oil and gas interest" within the statutory meaning of KRS
section 353.620.7 3 In so doing, the Talbott court established new
law.
74
The court, in reaching its decision, incorporated the proce-
dural aspects of administrative pooling" with the statutory inter-
pretation of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Smith v. Rogers.
76
In Smith, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that although
the public policy of conservation 77 applies to voluntary as well as
involuntary pooling, 78 KRS sections 353.630 and 353.64079 applied
' Id.; see also KRS §§ 353.510(11) (1983), 353.630(4) (1983), 353.640(2) (1983), and
353.651(2)(b) (1983).
" Brief, supra note 41.
7" Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
- 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
7 Id. at 517.
' SHORT, supra note 19, § 31.02(c) at 129 (stating that "It is arguable than an
overriding royalty interest owner takes subject to all the terms and conditions of the lease
including the pooling clause and, therefore, is not a necessary party. Absent some caselaw,
however, the prudent course of action is to have the overriding royalty interest owner join
in or ratify the pooling declaration.").
15 KRS §§ 353.630-353.640 (1983) (these statutes require notice to all persons owning
an oil or gas interest before pooling by administrative order can commence).
16 702 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1986).
1 KRS § 353.500 (1983) provides:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this Commonwealth to foster
conservation of all mineral resources, to encourage exploration for such
resources, to protect correlative rights of land and mineral owners, to prohibit
waste and unnecessary surface loss and damage and to encourage the maxi-
mum recovery of oil and gas from all deposits thereof now known and which
may hereafter be discovered; and to promote safety in the operation thereof.
To that end, KRS [§§] 353.500 to 353.720 is enacted and shall be liberally
construed to give effect to such public policy.
702 S.W.2d at 427.
, See supra note 74.
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only to involuntary pooling.80 As a consequence, the statutory
provisions stating that "pooling must be approved on an appli-
cation to the oil and gas conservation commission, and proper
notice be given to interested surface owners and a hearing held,"'"
were inapplicable to voluntary pooling agreements made in fur-
therance of conservation.
8 2
The Talbott court interpreted Smith to mean that "owners of
'all oil and gas interests' in a given pool may privately give their
written consent to pooling in furtherance of conservation, thereby
bypassing the Department's notice and hearing process. "83 Such
a conclusion is logical, especially when one accepts that the policy
behind compulsory pooling statutes is to encourage voluntary
pooling, not to provide for compulsory state action.84
The Talbott decision turned on clarification of the phrase
"owner of any oil or gas interest.''85 In analyzing the phrase,
Judge Gudgel implicitly limited the meaning of "ownership of oil
and gas" to a right to explore for and reduce the oil and gas to
possession by removing it from its natural environment.16 His
opinion also held that a lessee who assigns his interest and reserves
an overriding royalty relinquishes all right to explore for and
reduce oil and gas to possession.r
Under Kentucky law, one who holds an oil and gas lease
acquires a right to explore for, and to reduce oil and gas to
possession. 8 The leaseholder may convey all lease rights to a third
702 S.W.2d at 427.
8I ld. at 427.
Id. (stating that "There would be no point or advantage to voluntary pooling that
it is supposed to encourage, if the same cumbersome procedures attendant to involuntary
pooling had to be met.").
'3 717 S.W.2d at 517.
702 S.W.2d at 427, citing 38 Am. JuR. 2D, GAs AND O 164 (1968); KRS §
353.630(2)(b). Smith is distinguishable from Talbott because the original lease in Smith
contained a pooling clause, while the Baker lease in Talbott did not. However, public
policy, which encourages voluntary pooling, negates raising this distinction.
, KRS § 353.620 (1983).
717 S.W.2d at 517 (the court defined a lessee's fights to be a right to explore for
and produce oil and gas), citing Williams' Adm'r v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 143
S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1940); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934); cf. Coleman
v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1953).
17 717 S.W.2d at 517 (the court defined an assignment as a transfer of the lessee's
rights to explore for and produce oil and gas).
" See supra note 86; see also Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.
1952); Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1952).
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party and reserve an overriding royalty interest.8 9 The Talbott
court held, however, that the conveyor was not an "owner of
any oil and gas interest." 9° Therefore, in order to interpret "owner
of an oil and gas interest," the Talbott court had to justify
excluding a conveyor from exercising control over the conveyed
property interest.
Since all the original lessors signed the pooling agreement,
and no other conveyances were involved, the court narrowed the
scope of its decision to the facts of the case. Implicit in the
Talbott court's conclusion was its finding that an overriding roy-
alty owner, such as an assignor, takes "subject to all the terms
and conditions of the lease, including the pooling clause and,
therefore, it is not a necessary party" 91 to a voluntary pooling
agreement. In addition, the court held that a pooling provision is
included in the lease or conveyance, even in agreements which
are silent with respect to pooling.*2 Only specific prohibitions in
the lease or conveyance will restrict pooling. 93
The Talbott court was unable to find any precedent to justify
excluding Rice from the definition of "owner of an oil and gas
interest" and was forced to construct its result. The court applied
the definition of "assignment" in Coleman v. Owens9 to the
case, and concluded that an assignee obtains all of the assignor's
rights.9 While not clearly defining "rights," the Talbott court
cited oil and gas law as supporting the idea that "rights" referred
to all rights to explore for and produce oil and gas.
96
The Talbott court adopted the Hall v. Fullerl court's defini-
tion of royalty, emphasizing that a royalty interest was an interest
See supra text accompanying notes 39 and 87.
Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
9, SHORT, supra note 19, § 31.02(C) at 129.
92 717 S.W.2d at 517.
93 Id.
, 254 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1953) (Owens involved a lease of land for loading coal, and
cited cases which indicate that landlord-tenant law was applied (citations omitted)). In
citing Owens, the Talbott court apparently was applying landlord-tenant law to an oil and
gas lease, an application not practiced in many jurisdictions. See SHORT, supra note 19, §
25.02 at 57; see also WaIi MS & MEYFRs, supra note 1, at 412.
91 717 S.W.2d at 517; Bowling v. Garber, 61 S.W.2d 1102 (Ky. 1933); Cities Service
Oil Co. v. Taylor, 45 S.W.2d 1039 (Ky. 1932), 79 A.L.R. 1374.
717 S.W.2d at 517, citing Williams' Adm'r v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 143
S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1940); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
352 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1962).
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in oil and gas which has been produced. 98 Utilizing the Owens
definition of assignments, and the Fuller definition of royalty,
the court drew a nexus between Owens and Fuller. The court
concluded that an assignment of all lease rights is a conveyance
of all ownership interest in any oil or gas in place. 99 A retention
of an overriding royalty interest, however, is a retention of an
ownership interest in oil or gas which has been produced.'10 This
conclusion is valid, because under Kentucky law, oil and gas in
place is real property.'0 ' Oil and gas becomes personal property
only after severance from its natural environment.' 2
Satisfied that the pooling agreement was valid, and basing its
opinion on state statute, °0 the Talbott court concluded that Rice's
ownership rights to produced oil and gas were limited by the
percentage of property the Baker lease contributed to the pool.'
4
Thus, the court based its opinion on statutes' °5 which the Smith
court had held inapplicable to voluntary pooling."06 However,
when combined with the policies behind enacting these statutes,' 7
the fugacious nature of oil and gas justifies application to deter-
mine division of production.
III. CONSEQUENCES
The consequences of Talbott are most readily apparent in the
everyday practice of drafting conveyances of oil and gas leases
which reserve overriding royalties. Talbott may be read in two
different ways. First, the decision may be holding that unless
otherwise specifically stated in the conveyance instrument, the
royalties from pooled wells will be apportioned according to the
percentage of the pooled acreage a lease represents. Secondly, the
717 S.W.2d at 517.
Id. (A lessee acquires a right to explore for and produce oil and gas in place. An
assignment is a conveyance of the lessor's interest.).
'0 Id. (A lessee who conveys his rights to a third party no longer has any rights to
explore for and produce oil and gas, only a right to a percentage of production.).
,0, 143 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1940).
102 Id.
103 KRS §§ 353.630-353.640 (1983).
717 S.W.2d at 517.
' See supra note 74.
702 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1986).
7 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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decision may be read to hold that in all cases, royalties from
pooled wells will be apportioned. The second interpretation, how-
ever, runs counter to the inherent right of parties to contract.
Assuming the first interpretation to be correct, the question re-
maining after Talbott is: how can a royalty owner protect his
royalty rights?
CONCLUSION
Pooling is a necessary and encouraged practice. 0 8 Inherent in
the power to pool is the power to apportion the pooled property,
with each property in the pooled unit contributing and receiving
from the unit proportionate shares.
Rice Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott sets precedent by holding
that an overriding royalty owner is not an "owner of an oil and
gas interest," and therefore, is not a necessary party to a pooling
agreement.1°9 This decision increases the importance of carefully
drafting the documents conveying oil and gas interests. The Tal-
bott decision implies that pooled property will be apportioned in
all cases, unless the instrument conveying the oil and gas interests
restricts the power to apportion. Therefore, it appears that a
conveyor's only protection is to defensively negotiate and draft
conveyance agreements.
ROBERT OUTLAW Fox
,01 See supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text (conservation and economics).
Im 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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